New Cases 02-08-05

In this appeal we are asked to determine the sufficiency of allegations in an action by a judgment creditor under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West 2006)). In 2004, plaintiff, Apollo Real Estate Investment Fund IV, L.P. (Apollo), was assigned an Ohio judgment obtained by its assignor against several corporate entities. Thereafter, Apollo commenced this proceeding to collect money it claims was wrongfully transferred to them by one of those debtor corporations in avoidance of payment for work earlier performed by the judgment creditor. Apollo’s amended complaint alleged two counts under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, one count for breach of fiduciary duty, and one count for unjust enrichment. The circuit court’s order dismissing the complaint contained a Rule 304(a) finding allowing this appeal to proceed. Apollo appeals only the dismissal of the claims under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. For the follow reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

10. Criminal Law/Motions to Suppress Evidence: Affirmed: In Hudson, the Supreme Court held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce rule. Therefore, the only issue was whether article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution required suppression. With limited exceptions, our supreme court has construed article I, section 6, in "lockstep" with the Supreme Court's construction of the fourth amendment. The "narrow exception carved to the lockstep doctrine in the fourth amendment context" does not support carving out another exception under the very different circumstances presented here.The trial court properly applied Hudson to defendant's state constitutional argument, we hold that the court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence seized in the search of defendant's home. Therefore, the trial court's judgment must stand. Burke, J. with McLaren, J. specially concurring.

No. 2-08-0271 People v. Glorioso Filed 2-16-10 (RJC)

Defendant, Keith A. Glorioso, was charged with unlawful possession of a substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2006)). He moved to suppress evidence seized under a warrant to search his house. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the search had violated the "knock and announce" rule, but that, under Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006), the exclusionary rule did not apply. After a stipulated bench trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced to 24 months' probation. On appeal, he contends that, although the evidence cannot be excluded under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV), it should be excluded under article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6). We affirm.

11. Forcible Entry & Detainer: Affirmed: A trial court retains authority to enforce its own orders and where an order contemplates future conduct, it may be inferred that the court retained jurisdiction to enforce it. The November 7, 2007, agreed order clearly contemplated future conduct, therefore, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce its order. Hutchinson, J.

No. 2-09-0034 Block 418, LLC v. Uni-Tel Communications Group, Inc. Filed 2-16-10 (RJC)

In June 2007, plaintiff, Block 418, LLC, filed a complaint pursuant to the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (the Act) (735 ILCS 5/9--101 et seq. (West 2006)) against defendant, Uni-Tel Communications Group, Inc. On November 7, 2007, the trial court entered an agreed order, which stated that, inter alia, "[t]his Agreed Order is a final order resolving all matters arising under this lawsuit, but this Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Agreed Order." Subsequently, when defendant defaulted on its rent obligation, plaintiff sought to amend its complaint. Defendant objected, claiming that it had complied with the November 7, 2007, agreed order, and thus, the trial court had lost jurisdiction for future claims. The trial court determined that jurisdiction was proper, and it later found in favor of plaintiff and awarded damages to plaintiff of $45,328.49, the amount of rent due from October, November, and the 12 days in December 2008 during which defendant occupied the premises. Defendant timely appeals, challenging the trial court's jurisdictional authority, and alternatively, the award of damages. We affirm.

12. Criminal Law/Motions to Suppress: Affirmed: The record shows that the police officer, after issuing the warning and returning the paperwork to defendant, immediately posed three questions that were short, succinct, and formulated to produce “yes” or “no” responses. The fourth and final question from the officer produced defendant’s voluntary consent for the officer to conduct a search. We conclude the inquiries by the officer did not unfairly convert this lawful stop into an unconstitutional seizure of defendant or his vehicle. The motion to suppress contraband was properly denied because defendant’s interaction with Officer Blanks, after receiving the written warning, was voluntary and consensual. Wright, J.

No. 3-05-0420 People v. Roa Filed 2-10-10 (RJC)

Defendant Andres Roa appeals from his conviction for violation of section 401(a)(2)(A) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2004)). On appeal, defendant raised the single issue of whether the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of defendant’s vehicle. We affirmed the decision of the trial court on October 31, 2007. Defendant appealed to our supreme court which, in light of the postopinion case of People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262 (2008), ordered this court to vacate its earlier judgment and reconsider its decision to determine if a different result is now warranted. People v. Roa, 229 Ill. 2d 687 (2008)(order). In light of Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d at 262, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

13. Criminal Law/Discovery/Sanctions: Reversed & Remanded: Defendant’s claim of vindictive prosecution does not qualify as an affirmative defense subject to mandatory pretrial discovery pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 412. Defendant did not raise a colorable basis for a vindictive prosecution claim. In the absence of a colorable claim, the motion to compel did not request information material to a viable defense or pretrial dismissal of the pending charges. Rather, the request to compel constituted an endeavor to gain access to the State’s work product. Work product is not subject to disclosure under Supreme Court Rule 412(j)(i) (188 Ill. 2d R. 412(j)(i)), making the request itself unreasonable. Wright, J.

No. 3-08-1025 People v. Peterson Filed 2-10-10 (RJC)

On May 22, 2008, the State filed a complaint against defendant Drew Peterson for unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(7)(ii) (West 2006)), followed by a subsequent two-count indictment, filed on July 11, 2008, charging defendant with two alternate counts of the same weapons charge. Claiming vindictive and selective prosecution to be an affirmative defense, defendant filed a motion to compel discovery requesting all documentation reviewed by the State when deciding to file the UUW charge. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion for additional discovery over the State’s objection. The State refused to comply with the court’s order regarding discovery on the grounds that defendant’s motion did not sufficiently raise a claim of vindictive or selective prosecution warranting further discovery. As a sanction for the State’s refusal to follow the court’s order, the court dismissed the UUW charges with prejudice. The State filed this interlocutory appeal. We reverse.

14. Personal Injury/Auto Accidents: Affirmed: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the plaintiff's prior accidents and injuries. Crt. has declined to accept a rigid rule that photographs are always admissible or that expert testimony is always necessary for those photographs to be admissible. The critical question in admitting those photographs into evidence is whether the jury can properly relate the vehicular damage depicted in the photos to the injury without the aid of an expert. This question is an evidentiary question left to the discretion of the trial court. In this case, the jury could assess the relationship between the damage to the vehicles and the plaintiff's injuries without the aid of an expert. In Illinois, statements regarding settlement negotiations or offers to settle are generally not admissible. However, in this case, the defendant's statements during closing argument cannot be construed to infer prior settlement offers or negotiations, nor did the defendant make any statements inferring that the defendant would have to personally pay any judgment entered for the plaintiff. Instead, those statements were utilized by the defendant for impeachment purposes. Welch, J. with Chapman, J. dissenting.

No. 5-08-0185 Ford v. Grizzle Filed 2-17-10 (RJC)

The plaintiff, Richard D. Ford, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Madison County entering a judgment for the defendant, Terry Grizzle, pursuant to a jury verdict. On appeal, the plaintiff raises numerous issues, which we restate as follows: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion in limine concerning prior accidents and injuries, (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion in limine concerning the amount of damage to the plaintiff's vehicle, photographs of the plaintiff's vehicle, and any argument regarding minimal impact, (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing statements regarding settlement to be heard by the jury, and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment entered by the circuit court.

15. Venue/Motions to Transfer: Affirmed: The sole issue is whether venue is proper under the transactional prong of our venue statute. Determining venue under this prong requires consideration of two key variables: the nature of the cause of action and the place where the cause of action sprang into existence. This case does not presents so blatant an attempt at forum-shopping that we must depart from the rule that a plaintiff is entitled to choose any forum where venue is proper. We conclude that the court properly denied the motion to transfer. Chapman, J.

No. 5-08-0247 Kaiser v. Doll-Pollard Filed 2-11-10 (RJC)

This appeal involves a motion to transfer a medical malpractice action from St. Clair County to Clinton County based on improper venue. Plaintiff Margie Kaiser (the plaintiff) underwent a hysterectomy at St. Joseph's Hospital in Clinton County but was transferred to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in St. Clair County for postoperative care. The defendants, the doctor who performed the hysterectomy and her employer, appeal an order denying their motion to transfer. They argue that venue in St. Clair County is not proper because (1) the plaintiff does not allege that the defendants committed any negligent acts in St. Clair County and (2) all the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action arose in Clinton County. We affirm.

3 Supreme Court Cases Posted 02-09-10

1. Traffic Court: Trial Court Reversed and Remanded: Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test is generally accepted in scientific community; Proper foundation needed. Garman, J.

2. Criminal Law:Trial Court: Flash message by police may not be hearsay; The wide latitude extended to prosecutors during their closing remarks has been held to include some degree of both sarcasm and invective to express their points. Karmeier, J

3. Mental Health Code: Appellate and Trial Court Affirmed: The court declined to hold that a patient must be physically released before a new petition is filed. Kilbride, J.

The question presented in this appeal is whether section 3–611 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3–611 (West 2006)) and the discharge provisions in sections 1–109 and 2–104 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/1–109, 2–104 (West 2006)) mandate full physical release of an individual previously ordered discharged before the State may file a subsequent petition for involuntary admission. The circuit court of Winnebago County ordered that respondent be involuntarily admitted pursuant to section 3–600 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3–600 (West 2006)). The appellate court affirmed, rejecting respondent’s argument that the petition seeking his involuntary 1Respondent contends an earlier petition for involuntary admission was dismissed by the trial court on April 10, 2007, and he was ordered discharged, but the record does not contain this order. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting respondent’s argument that the petition seeking his involuntary admission was untimely filed under section 3–611 of the Code. 386 Ill. App. 3d 337, 347. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

4. Pension: Affirmed: Interpretation of law by agency is reviewed de novo; service of governor was for State of Illinois, one pension fund and was forfeited by felony convictions. Thomas, J.

The issue in this case is whether, as a result of his multiple federal felony convictions, former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan, Sr., has forfeited all of the pension benefits he earned from the General Assembly Retirement System. For the reasons that follow, we hold that he has.

5. Juvenile Court/Abuse & Neglect: Appellate Court Reversed, Trial Court Affirmed: Time in prison does not toll the 9 month period in which reasonable progress must be made toward the return of the child. Freeman, J.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court of Peoria County found respondent Stephanie L. an unfit parent under section 1(D)(m)(iii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii) (West 2008)). The circuit court subsequently terminated respondent’s parental rights to her three children. A divided appellate court reversed and remanded. Nos. 3–08–0941, 3–08–0942, 3–08–0943 cons. (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

7 Appellate Court Cases Posted 02-16-10

1. Insurance Coverage Law: Reversed and remanded: Plaintiff insurance company seeking contribution from second insurer relating to settlement of medical malpractice action could not proceed initially under theory of equitable contribution between primarily liable co-insurers, and thereafter claim that it was a secondary insurer and that defendant was a primary insurer; and where insured doctor expressly requested that one insurer defend the claim against him, and not the other, trial court erred in granting award as to only half of non-selected insurer's expenses in defending doctor. Theis, J. (Opinion of 12-22-09 withdrawn)

2. Public Employee Disability/Health Benefits: Affirmed: Firefighter injured during "live fire" training exercise not responding to event that is "reasonably believed to be an emergency," and was therefore not entitled to health benefits under Public Safety Employee Benefits Act. McBride, J. (Gordon, R., J., dissenting)

3. Criminal Law: Affirmed: When defense counsel did not specify any evidence as to how co-defendant's testimony would incriminate defendant, or how claim of reasonable doubt by co-defendant would be antagonistic to defendant's claim of self-defense, denial of motion to sever trial not an abuse of discretion. McBride, J.

4. Criminal Law: Affirmed as modified: Trial court correctly imposed $20 "preliminary hearing" fee under Section 4-2002.1(a) of the Counties Code, despite fact that defendant was indicted, in contradistinction to People v. Brown, 388 Ill.App.3d 104 (1st Dist. 2009); application of Violent Crimes Assistance Act fine, Children's Advocacy Center charge, and Medical Costs Fund assessment also discussed. Gordon, R., J.

5. Adverse Possession Law/Supreme Court Rule 137 Sanctions: Affirmed in part and reversed in part: trial court ruling denying that plaintiffs were entitled to property by adverse possession reversed, but award of sanctions in amount of $20,500 under Supreme Court Rule 137 for failure of defendant and his attorneys to reasonably investigate plaintiffs' counsel's alleged conflict of interest upheld. Appleton, J.

6. Criminal Law: Remanded with directions: Pro se defendant's document filed with Clerk of the Circuit Court should properly have been docketed as a motion to withdraw guilty plea, rather than a notice of appeal, and cause remanded to trial court for compliance with Supreme Court Rule 604(d). McCullough, J.

7. Civil Procedure: Reversed and remanded: Trial court ruling that "company doctor" was an "employee" for purposes of application of Supreme Court Rule 237 governing production of a party's "employee" at trial held to be erroneous in light of affidavits and testimony presented by that party as to doctor's status. Steigmann, J.

11 Appellate Court Cases Posted 02-10-10

1. Criminal Law: Reversed and remanded for sentencing: Conviction for possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver reduced to possession only where chemist combined six packets of purported substance before testing thus obviating conclusion that each packet contained controlled substance, and evidence insufficient to sustain conviction for intent to deliver. McBride, J.

2. Insurance Coverage Law: Affirmed: Where two persons injured in automobile accident recovered $100,000 each from other driver's policy, their under-insured motorist claim under $300,000 policy with "split limits" limited their recovery to a total of $100,000, not $200,000 as they claimed, and trial court grant of declaratory judgment to UIM carrier affirmed: Steele, J. (Murphy, J., specially concurring)

3. Insurance Coverage Law: Affirmed in part and reversed in part: Where defendant insurance companies failed either to represent plaintiffs in EEOC action or file for a declaratory judgment, they were estopped from asserting a "late notice" defense and had a duty to defend, but Section 155 claim for vexatious refusal to settle properly dismissed by trial court. Murphy, J.

4. Negligence Law: Affirmed: Tort Immunity Act prohibits suit against Metra for injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff who was "jaywalking" and allegedly tripped over bolt on railroad tie, as plaintiff was not an "intended and permitted" user of premises, and grant of summary judgment was proper. Coleman, J.

5. Criminal Law: Reversed and remanded: Authentication of "surveillance" video, which purportedly documented defendant's surreptitious theft of USC, under "silent witness" doctrine not established in light of lack of evidence regarding preservation of the recording with no changes, additions or deletions. Jorgensen, J.

6. Negligence law: Reversed and remanded: Defendants' contract with state Department of Transportation to design a bridge deck and median barrier on expressway imposed a duty to do so using "skill and diligence normally employed by professional engineers," and affidavit of plaintiff's expert that they did not was sufficient to withstand defendants' motion for summary judgment in wrongful death action, grant of which was error. O'Malley, J. (Hutchinson, J., dissenting)

7. Criminal Law: Reversed and remanded: Trial court dismissal of defendant's pro se post-conviction petition because of failure to comply with Post-Conviction Hearing Act time requirements was reversed and remanded to determine whether defendant's failure to raise claim that two armed robbery convictions violated "one act-one crime" rule was due to defendant's "culpable negligence." McLaren, J.

8. Criminal Law: Reversed and remanded: rial court failure to comply with "post-amended" Supreme Court Rule 431(b) by not giving jurors "an opportunity to respond" regarding Zehr questions deemed plain error "so substantial that it affected the fundamental fairness of the proceedings'" and required reversal of defendant's conviction for armed robbery. McCullough, J.

9. Criminal Law: Affirmed as modified and remanded: $5 drug-court assessment is a fine as opposed to a fee, and defendant is entitled to $5 per day credit under Section 110-14 (a) of Code of Criminal Procedure, and, in apparent case of first impression, $200 DNA-analysis "assessment" under Section 5-4-3(j) of Unified Code of Corrections is a fine, not a fee. Turner, J.

10. Negligence Law: Affirmed: Application of Section 876 of Restatement (Second) of Torts resulted in conclusion that defendant was not liable for tortious conduct of second driver leading to decedent's death, merely because defendant agreed to lead second driver to intended location, in spite of defendant's alleged speeding, and grant of summary judgment to defendant was proper. Steigmann, J.

11. Criminal Law: Defendant motion granted and case remanded: Supreme Court Rule 604(d) dictates that before perfecting defendant's appeal of guilty plea, counsel for defendant must review actual transcript of proceedings held at time of plea, regardless of who will bear cost of transcript, and so certify in writing, even if counsel was defendant's lawyer at time of plea. Knecht, J.

13 Appellate Court Cases Posted 02-04-10

1. Administrative Review: Reversed and Remanded: Board permitted to allow Village to intervene and Village Board Officials did not have to recuse themselves; However, Village Attorneys interjections into the hearing, while acting as a Pensions Board member, deprived plaintiff of due process and fair hearing. Theis, J.

2. Criminal Law: Affirmed in part, reversed in part: Even though the statute does not specifically call for a mental state, Section 5/4-3 of the Criminal Code provides for guidelines for mens rea generally; that section and others(4-9) analyzed; “Where possession has been shown, an inference of guilty knowledge can be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances. Toomin, J.

3. Post Conviction Petition: Affirmed: Analysis of successive post conviction petitions and requirements to seek court permission to file them and requirements such as cause and prejudice test. Murphy, J.

4. Contract/Indemnification: Affirmed: No question of fact existed which precluded indemnification since agreement clear the activities of student were covered by agreement and principle suit arose from activities of student in X-Ray room. O'Mara Frossard, J.

5. Administrative Review: Circuit Court affirmed, reversing Pension Board's decision: An agency’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence where the
opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Subsequent accident that aggravates the condition that was weakened by a work-related accident does not break the causal chain. Lampkin, J.

6. Civil Procedure/Common Carrier/Attorneys Fees: Affirmed: Judgment n.o.v is proper when, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it so overwhelmingly favors the movant that there was a total failure or lack of evidence to prove a necessary element. A rebuttable presumption of negligence is raised against a common carrier when a plaintiff shows that she was a passenger, an accident happened with an apparatus wholly under the control of the carrier, and that an injury was inflicted. Once that presumption is raised, the carrier must explain why the accident resulted from a cause for which it should not be held responsible. The purpose of granting sanctions is not to punish a party, but to effectuate the goals of discovery. Penalties ranging from a reasonable attorney fee to monetary penalties may be imposed even if the omissions are inadvertent. Defendant's expert refused to produce his income tax records and then, in middle of deposition, resigned as expert. Murphy, J.

7. Criminal Law: Affirmed: Criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Identification by a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction if the defendant is viewed under circumstances permitting a positive identification. Ineffective assistance of counsel discussed. Quinn, J.

8. Criminal Law: Reversed and Remanded: Issue preserved by appeal if raised in pre-trial motion in limine and post trial motion; plain error doctrine analyzed; gang affiliation evidence when crime not gang related improper. Gallagher, J.

9. Criminal,J.l Law: Affirmed: Waiver of error by taking different position at trial than at appeal; Use of hearsay testimony evidence of victim per 115-10 analyzed. McBride, J.

10. Freedom of Information Act: Affirmed: Fee of 10 cents per assessment reasonable; County Code does not apply since the records are not free online. McDade, J.

11. Traffic Court:Reversed and Remanded: There is no statutory or constitutional basis for the circuit court's lack-of-probable-cause dismissal of the misdemeanor traffic citation against Davis. Holdridge, J.

12. Negligence/Products Liability: Affirmed: Elements of negligent design cause of action analyzed and discussed; In addition to defect in product at time product left manufacturer, plaintiff must prove standard of care and deviation from standard; crucial question in a negligent-design case is whether the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in the design of the product. To show that the manufacturer acted unreasonably based on the foreseeability of harm, the plaintiff must show the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk posed by the product design at the time of manufacture. a manufacturer has a continuing duty to warn of a hazard of which it had a duty to warn at the time the product was manufactured, including using reasonable care to inform foreseeable users of product developments designed to eliminate the hazard. Stewart, J.

13. Post Conviction: Affirmed: Post Conviction act requirements discussed and analyzed; elements of ineffective counsel analyzed. No prejudice caused by witnesses military uniforms. Chapman, J.

3 Supreme Court Cases Posted 02-04-10

1. Medical Negligence: Constitutional Law: Affirmed in Part and Remanded: Caps on Pain and Suffering in Medical Negligence Cases are unconstitutional on their face based on separation of powers grounds. Fitzgerald, CJ. Karmeier and Garman concurred in part and dissented in part.

2. Post Conviction Petitions: Appellate Court and Trial Court Reversed and Cause Remanded: Petition created a question of fact whether defendant's counsel was ineffective for failing to request hearing for fitness to stand trial Kilbride, J., Garman, joined by Karmeier and Thomas JJ, dissented

Police responding to a 2002 report of a Chicago disturbance found Raymond Brown outside his apartment, holding a butcher knife. Told to drop it, he did not do so but, instead, advanced, waiving the knife and making threats. He was shot by police in the leg and lower back before being arrested. A conviction was entered in a Cook County bench trial for attempted first degree murder of a peace officer, and a 25-year sentence was imposed. The appellate court affirmed. Brown then filed a pro se postconviction petition, claiming that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to request a hearing on his fitness for trial. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit, and the appellate court affirmed. In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that Brown’s petition should not have been dismissed but could advance to the second stage of postconviction proceedings because he had stated the gist of a constitutional claim in alleging that he had told his trial attorney that he had been taking medication for bipolar disorder and depression and that he had previously attempted suicide. Brown also alleged that he had been under medication at the time of his trial and that his attorney lied in claiming to be unaware of this. Attached to the petition were affidavits from defendant’s mother and aunt indicating that counsel had been informed about defendant’s bipolar medications and suicide attempts. At the original sentencing hearing, Brown had stated that he was attempting “suicide by police” because he had seen a news report about a man killed by police for threatening them with a machete. The supreme court found that the total record, which should be liberally construed, creates a factual dispute as to whether there was a bona fide doubt of petitioner’s fitness for trial and that the claim of ineffectiveness in failing to seek a fitness hearing is arguably supported. The cause was remanded for second-stage postconviction proceedings, at which Brown may have counsel appointed, an amended petition may be submitted, and a determination made as to whether an evidentiary hearing should be held.

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5 Appellate Court Cases Posted 02-25-10

4. Criminal Law: Affirmed: Sections 5-8-1(a)(5) and 5-5-3(c)(8) do not conflict, and defendant properly sentenced as a Class X offender for Class 2 offense of burglary in light of his prior convictions, and MSR term properly set at three years, not two: Pope, J.

15 Appellate Court Cases Posted 02-19-10

2. Criminal Law: Affirmed: Delivery of illegal drug means transfer with or without consideration. Rob't Gordon, J.

4. Civil Procedure:Three Certified Questions Answered: Law of the case and its two exceptions analyzed; refiling of case was new action; Collateral estoppel defined and analyzed; 90 day delay in 622 affidavit does not apply to time to serve summons under 103(b)Neville, J.

6. Criminal Law: Reversed and Remanded: State's petition to extend period of conditional release was filed before period was over and trial court retained jurisdiction over the defendant. Karnezis, J.